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The Case against Different-Sex Marriage in Kant 
 
MARTIN STICKER 





Recently, a number of Kantians have argued that despite Kant’s own disparaging 
comments about same-sex intercourse and marriage, his ethical and legal 
philosophy lacks the resources to show that they are impermissible. I go further by 
arguing that his framework is in fact more open to same-sex than to different-sex 
marriage. Central is Kant’s claim that marriage requires equality between spouses. 
Kant himself thought that men and women are not equal, and some of his more 
insightful remarks on the issue reveal that he was also aware that, as a matter of 
fact, women were disenfranchised by society, and suffer legal and other forms of 
discrimination. Kant, according to his own account, cannot approve of 
heterosexual marriage. Same-sex couples, by contrast, can satisfy the crucial 
equality condition. I conclude with a suggestion for refocus with respect to the 
issues at hand, calling for attention to more complex and insidious forms of 
inequality than deprivation of rights and full civil participation. 
Keywords:  marriage, sex, equality, gender, natural ends, rights, active and passive 
citizenship   
 
In this article, I will explore what Kant’s views about marriage and gender entail 
when we think them through more thoroughly than he himself did. I will argue that 
same-sex marriage is more capable than different-sex marriage of embodying the 
goals and ideals of marital union as Kant understood the latter.1  
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In the first section, I briefly explain why Kant thinks that marriage is morally 
significant and why it requires equality between spouses. In the second section, I 
establish that Kant has to allow for same-sex marriage. In the third section, I show 
how certain unions are incompatible with marriage as Kant understands it, because 
these unions are not between equals. In the fourth section, I discuss in what sense, 
according to Kant, men and women are unequal. In the fifth section, I show how, 
given Kant’s own assumptions, men and women can never or hardly ever enter into a 
marriage contract with each other. At the same time, however, I suggest that we need 
to pay attention to more complex and insidious forms of inequality than the ones Kant 
focuses on.  
I should note that while this article proceeds via textual exegesis, it goes beyond 
historical exegesis in two senses. Firstly, I discuss Kant’s conception of marriage in 
the light of a contemporary idea that Kant was unaware of, namely, that marriage can 
extend to other than heterosexual couples. Secondly, I do not claim that Kant himself 
believed that same-sex marriage is closer to his ideal of marriage than different-sex 
marriage is. I only maintain that this follows given Kant’s conception of marriage and 
his views about the differences between men and women – his merely sexist views as 
well as those that correctly represent de facto social and legal gender inequalities. 
From this I hope that we can gain a better understanding of what Kant’s conception of 
marriage entails, as well as of the notion of equality between partners that is both 
pivotal for Kant and also central to how we today think of marriage and romantic 
partnerships.  
1. Kant on Marriage 
Kant’s sexual ethics and conception of marriage is of great significance for the 
emerging scholarly debate on the history of philosophical reflection on same-sex 
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marriage, as Kant explains the ethical rationale for marriage ‘without appealing to 
either religious tradition or legal precedent’ (Altman 2011: 140), and he offers ‘a 
secular argument for an institution of marriage’ (Wilson 2004: 121). However, his 
discussion of sex and marriage is at times phrased in crude ways. This has led to 
much ridicule, such as Paul Guyer’s (2006: 276) quip that ‘Kant’s views about sex 
are, to put it mildly, bizarre, in part at least either the views of a bachelor or the views 
that made him a bachelor’. Kant does largely abstract from elements that we today 
think of as important to marriage, such as emotional investment.2 His discussion was 
also unusual in his own time, since his conception of marriage is ‘radically 
detraditionalized’ (Kuster 2011: 338).3 Kant is interested in the question of why 
marriage is legally and morally significant, and he believes that neither emotions, nor 
nature, nor tradition, nor religion (the traditional sources of the value of marriage) can 
provide an answer. His sterile and technical discussion might seem off-putting at first, 
but it does express Kant’s earnest attempt to discover what makes this aspect of 
human community and interaction morally and legally significant. His argument for 
why there must be marriage draws on many ideas that would require detailed 
discussion and critical scrutiny. In this section, I will summarize Kant’s view of the 
matter only insofar as they concern our main goal.  
For Kant, the reason why we need marriage at all is that sex is morally problematic. 
When having sex ‘a human being makes himself into a thing, which conflicts with the 
right of humanity in his own person’ (6: 278.8-9). When having sex, we use a person 
as ‘a consumable thing’ (6: 360.5) or as an instrument for satisfying desires and 
obtaining pleasure. Sex for Kant is a form of objectification since it entails that we 
make use of another for our pleasure and let another make use of ourselves in turn. 
Kant worries that this violates our and our partner’s humanity.4 If we use a person as a 
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means for sexual gratification, we lack proper regard for her as an end in herself or as 
something that is not exchangeable and not merely physical, and we lack proper 
regard for ourselves if we allow others to use us in this way or if we use ourselves in 
this way (cf. Groundwork, 4: 429.10-2).  
To better understand the problematic nature of sexual desire, let us briefly look at 
Seiriol Morgan (2003: sec. 3), who is sympathetic to Kant’s analysis. He argues that 
there are two problems that Kant has with sexual desire. The first is that when having 
sex a human being surrenders her humanity to her animal instincts and acts like a 
mere animal or even ‘makes himself into a thing’ (see above, as well as 6: 425, 27: 
385). The second, which Morgan takes to represent a deeper insight into the nature of 
sexual desire, is that Kant is in general concerned with our tendency to subjugate or 
dominate others. This tendency is a specifically human one, rooted in our competitive 
human nature and our unsocial sociability (7: 268.14-274.18; ‘Idea for a Universal 
History’, 8: 20.30), which drive us to crave other human beings’ esteem as well as to 
impose our wills upon them (7: 273.16-34). Kant was a pessimist about the general 
human drive to assert oneself over others. Sexual desire can easily be affected by this 
tendency, as it is a central element of our self-constitution and sex is a way of 
interacting that leaves both partners vulnerable to abuse, exploitation and domination. 
Sex thus can become a field of domination and subjugation, unless proper protections 
for all involved obtain. Morgan thinks that mutual consent is not sufficient protection 
in all cases. His account helps us make sense of Kant’s negative attitude to sex. The 
threat of domination and subjugation is a much more immediate moral concern for us 
today than the supposedly animalistic nature of sexual desires. 
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Sex for Kant leaves us with the problem of how we can protect ourselves and others 
from domination or how we can ‘treat each other with the dignity we deserve as 
rational persons when, in sexual terms, we are out to use each other for the sake of 
some end, be it our own pleasure or reproduction’ (Altman 2010: 312). It is important 
to note that finding a way to deal with the moral problem of sex is not optional for 
Kant. Despite its inherent danger, sex serves the natural end of the perpetuation of the 
human species.5 A human being without sexual impulses would even be ‘an imperfect 
individual, in that one would believe that he lacked the necessary organs, which 
would thus be an imperfection on his part, as a human being’ (27: 385.11-13). 
Kant believes that only in the context of marriage can two people have intercourse in 
which neither of the spouses is ‘dehumanized through the bodily use that one makes 
of the other’ (6: 359.31-2) or without there being the acute danger of one dominating 
the other. The reason that Kant gives is that in a marriage contract ‘one person is 
acquired by the other as if it were a thing, the one who is acquired acquires the other 
in turn: for in this way each reclaims itself and restores its personality’ (6: 278.6-22). 
Whilst this sounds extremely technical, Kant here does in fact outline a conception of 
marriage based on equality.  
Three things are important for our purpose here. Firstly, Kant talks about marriage as 
a form of acquisition. This manner of speaking is odd, given that we usually acquire 
objects, not persons. However, for much of its history marriage was seen as an 
(economic) transaction where fathers negotiated their daughters’ coming into 
possession by would-be sons-in-law. Furthermore, in the Doctrine of Right, Kant 
models rightful relationships in general on the paradigm of object possession6 and he 
thinks of marriage as a form of joint possession of material goods as well as of each 
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other as persons. We will discuss this more extensively in secs. 3 and 5. Secondly, the 
process Kant describes is reciprocal. I give myself to the other and the other gives 
herself to me and hence we both receive ourselves back.7 Thirdly, the process would 
not be possible, i.e. not result in a rightful marriage, if we could not acquire each 
other fully. If there is something my prospective spouse has or owns that I cannot 
own, the reciprocal giving would only be partial. My spouse would then acquire me 
fully but I would not fully acquire my spouse, and this means that I would not receive 
myself fully back in turn. Reciprocal and full possession of each other requires 
equality. I will argue in sec. 3 that we should understand the equality in question here 
as equality between legal persons meaning that two people share each other’s rights. 
Persons who cannot acquire each other reciprocally and fully are, according to Kant, 
banned from marrying each other.  
If both spouses have acquired each other fully and thus received themselves back 
fully, marriage secures the spouses’ humanity, since it allows ‘possession of an 
external object as a thing and use of it as a person’ (6: 276.19-20, see also 27: 
639.12-18), i.e. in marital intercourse safeguards are in place that protect each other, 
even if spouses engage in activities that make them vulnerable to domination or abuse 
by each other. A number of recent interpretations help us understand why Kant 
believes that mere consent is not sufficient for this purpose. Lara Denis argues that if 
sexual unions were without legally enforceable rights of the respective partners 
against each other, then ‘partners would lack the security and the implicit recognition 
of equality that legal marriage provides’ (Denis 2001: 12). Along the same lines, 
Helga Varden argues that ‘there must be a public person with the appropriate standing 
to adjudicate disputes amongst adults sharing a domestic sphere’ (Varden 2007: 206) 
and for this marriage needs the state to act as a ‘civil guardian over domestic 
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relations, the public adjudicator in conflicts, and as the guarantor of private property 
rights’ (213). I only fully recognize my partner as worthy of respect if I acknowledge 
the authority of an impartial arbiter who can with external force protect my partner 
from domination and subjugation. 
Kant’s idea that any kind of intercourse is dangerous or even morally wrong unless 
the partners are married is admittedly excessively moralistic whether or not marriage 
is open to same-sex couples.8 I will come back to this point towards the end of the 
article. What we should take away from Kant’s conception of marriage so far is that 
Kant believes that equality between partners is a constitutive feature of marriage. 
Marriage between unequals would enshrine already existing inequalities into a 
contract and thus pose a serious peril for the weaker partner to be dominated by their 
spouse. This contractually sanctioned inequality would make marital intercourse 
presumably even more dangerous for the weaker party than extramarital intercourse 
would be.  
2. Kant on Same-Sex Marriage 
In his Metaphysics of Morals as well as in some of the lecture notes Kant articulates a 
number of moral objections against same-sex intercourse. He dismisses same-sex 
intercourse as ‘unnatural’, exhibiting ‘unmentionable vices’, and he states that ‘there 
are no limitations or exceptions’ to this repudiation (6: 277.17-21). He also ranks 
masturbation, same-sex intercourse and bestiality as more despicable even than 
suicide (6: 425.6-36, 27: 391.6-392.5, 642.3-15).9 Without doubt, Kant still shared 
many of the traditional views of his time concerning sex, marriage and gender. He 
once defines marriage as ‘the union of two persons of different sexes for lifelong 
possession of each other’s sexual attributes’ (6: 277.25-6, my emphasis). That 
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marriage has to be between different sexes is, however, a superficial element of his 
account, as I will argue in this section.  
Matthew Altman (2010 and 2011) has recently made a compelling case that given 
Kant’s views on sex and marriage, the Kantian framework allows for and even 
requires same-sex marriage, ‘despite [Kant’s] protestations to the contrary’ (Altman 
2011: 158). I will now briefly rehearse four reasons why on Kant’s framework 
marriage should be open to same-sex couples.10 I will restrict myself to brief 
summaries of arguments, since the focus is not to establish that Kant’s framework is 
open to same-sex marriage, but that it might not be to heterosexual marriage 
(1) Altman’s (2011: 151) most fundamental argument in favour of same-sex marriage 
in Kant’s framework is that ‘Kant merely assumes a close link between our natural 
ends and the categorical imperative without showing how or why contradicting our 
natural ends would necessarily amount to irrational actions’.11 Kant seems to have 
admitted natural law theory into his ethics insofar as he concedes that ends that we 
have by nature are morally significant. He explicitly criticizes such an approach in the 
Groundwork (4: 441.25-445.15). Appeal to natural purposes, such as procreation, 
alone cannot establish duties, since duty is rooted in formal principles of the will. 
Kant’s moral dismissal of same-sex intercourse is incompatible with a fundamental 
assumption of his own ethical theory.12  
(2) Even if we admit the existence of morally significant natural ends, same-sex 
intercourse would not thwart the natural end of procreation – it simply does not 
advance it.13 It is not clear what Kant regards as the appropriate attitude to the end of 
procreation. He states that ‘one may not, at least, act contrary to that end’ (6: 426.3-
4). Kant certainly does not think that we have to maximize the promotion of this end 
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or promote it to the detriment of other ends, since we have a number of natural as well 
as other ends, some of which are even obligatory.14 He would not see it as morally 
problematic if, on many occasions, we pursue ends other than procreation. There 
could be cases in which disregarding a natural end amounts to undermining my 
agency. In these cases, it might become a moral duty that I pursue this end at least to 
such an extent that my agency is secured. However, same-sex intercourse does not 
undermine anyone’s agency and is not any more incapacitating than different-sex 
intercourse (Altman 2010: 324 and 2011: 153).  
(3) We consider the maxim to procreate as a ‘coordination maxim’ (Altman 2011: 
153). Not everyone needs to engage in procreation and certainly not all the time. If the 
population is increasing or remains steady without your contribution, there is no need 
for you to procreate. Altman’s point can be exegetically strengthened by paying close 
attention to how Kant phrases the natural end of procreation: it is not simply 
procreation that is a natural end but ‘begetting and bringing up children’ (6: 277.26-7, 
my emphasis). Bringing up children is a contribution to the survival of the species and 
something people can do without engaging in any potentially procreative sex. Those 
who engage in non-procreative sex are still able to do their part to secure species 
survival, for instance by raising foster children or, more indirectly, by paying taxes 
which then subsidize public childcare, schools, etc.15 
Kant’s negative attitude towards same-sex intercourse is at least partly the result of 
his conviction that it cannot fulfil the important function of procreation.16 
Nonetheless, as I argued, same-sex couples can perform important functions to further 
the natural goal of species survival. Furthermore, it is not even ‘requisite for human 
beings who marry to make [the end of begetting and bringing up children] their end in 
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order for their union to be compatible with right’ (6: 277.29-30). This is so for two 
reasons. Firstly, if procreation was a prerequisite for marriage, then ‘marriage would 
be dissolved when procreation ceases’ (6: 277.30-2), whereas Kant thinks that 
marriage is a ‘lifelong’ union (6: 277.25) even if one or both of the spouses become 
infertile (6: 279.29-35). Secondly, institutions and laws can only police external 
behaviour, not the adoption of ends (6: 381.30-5). Adopting certain ends can therefore 
not be required for marriage as we find it discussed in Kant’s political philosophy. 
(4) Kant does not object to different-sex marital intercourse rooted entirely in the 
desire for pleasure. What matters for Kant is not the naturalness or unnaturalness of 
the act, nor whether a couple intends to procreate, but whether the partners have 
bound themselves to each other in a way that ensures mutual respect (Altman 2011: 
155; see 6: 277.33-278.4, 426.1-32, 27: 639-40). Once the danger of objectification is 
dealt with, non-procreative sex is permissible. ‘The irony, then, is that it is not the 
immorality of homosexuality that precludes marriage; rather, not having marriage 
available to homosexuals makes homosexual unions immoral’ (Altman 2011: 161).17 
Kant’s teleological assumptions contradict central elements of his ethical theory; and 
even with these assumptions in place those who do not engage in procreative 
intercourse can still further the survival of the species. Furthermore, Kant does not 
object to purely recreational different-sex marital intercourse, and there is no rational 
grounds on which he could object to recreational same-sex marital intercourse. In 
fact, his conception of the moral dangers of intercourse, such as instrumentalization 
and domination, requires that same-sex intercourse take place within marriage.  
 
3. Kant on Marriage between Equals 
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In the wake of the fourth argument presented in the previous section, Altman (2011: 
156) remarks that to answer the question of what forms of sexual relations should 
enjoy a special legal status ‘Kant focuses entirely on whether the union would be 
between equals’. This is so because:  
Only a contract between equal partners accomplishes the purpose of marriage, 
because only when two people give possession of themselves completely to one 
another is sexual objectification overcome through a commitment to the spouse 
as a person. … A potential marriage between unequal partners could not fulfill 
the conditions of a morally appropriate union, so no law could ever validate it. 
(Altman 2011: 157)  
I believe that Altman is right, but that his defence of same-sex marriage has 
consequences he himself does not see. In this section, I will show how the notion of 
equality between sexual partners functions for Kant as a criterion for rightful 
marriages. In the next section, I will argue that men and women, according to Kant, 
are rarely if ever equals.  
In §26 of the Metaphysics of Morals’, entitled ‘Marriage Right’, Kant claims that ‘the 
relation of the partners in a marriage is a relation of equality of possession, equality 
both in their possession of each other as persons … and also equality in their 
possession of material goods’ (6: 278.24-9; see also 27: 388.28, 390.20-1).18 This is a 
crucial idea for my argument and we need to understand better the notion of equality 
at play here.  
It is relatively uncontroversial what equality of possession of material goods means. 
the respective possessions of both parties become part of one and the same household 
and hence joint property. The possession or acquisition of each other as persons, 
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however, is more difficult to understand. ‘Person’ for Kant is a moral term. 
Personality is an agent’s source of moral imputability (6: 26.10-1). It is unclear, 
however, what ‘possessing someone else’s source of imputability’ could mean. Kant 
hardly could have thought that I can have someone else’s actions imputed to me. We 
can rule this meaning of ‘person’ out in the context of Kant’s discussion of marriage. 
‘Person’ is also juridical terminology. Kant discusses marriage as a part of the ‘rights 
to a person akin to rights to a thing’ (auf dingliche Art persönliches Recht, 6: 276.17). 
In the context of marriage, ‘person’ is best understood as referring to the legal status 
of an agent, or her rights.  
We have already seen (sec. 1) that Kant models legal relationships on possession and 
acquisition. In the context of marriage, we can think of possessing someone as a 
person as a form of sharing in that person’s rights, just as equality of possession 
means that I can make use of the other person’s property as if it were mine (and in 
fact it is). Whilst I can of course not possess a right in the same way as I possess an 
object, I can share my partner’s rights in the sense that I am allowed to do what she 
does, because I too have these rights. If I have a right my partner cannot share in, I 
cannot but withhold something from her in the act of mutual giving that is required 
for marriage to be rightful. The reciprocity of marriage, that I give myself entirely to 
the other and that I receive myself back entirely would not obtain, since there would 
be an insurmountable difference (something I cannot give to my partner) between us. 
Notably, the above-quoted passage about equality between spouses is descriptive: it 
merely states what the relationship is between spouses who enter into a rightful 
marriage. Kant also intends equality between prospective spouses as a prescription or 
as a necessary condition for rightful forms of marriage. This becomes clear when he 
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argues in §26 that morganatic marriages (Ehe von der linken Hand) do not constitute 
rightful marriages (6: 279.12-6; see also 27: 642.23-6). Morganatic marriages are 
between people from different social ranks or classes,19 specifically between royalty 
and commoners. The class difference prevents the passage of certain rights, titles and 
privileges of the one to the other and to any children born of the marriage. The notion 
of morganatic marriage is strange to us today, since it presupposes a relatively fixed 
system of classes defined by family lines. Kant’s dismissal of the possibility of such 
marriage expresses the concern that there can be insurmountable power differences 
between people. Due to these differences one party can only acquire the other party 
on the cheap, i.e. without transferring all rights to the other party.20 Kant’s dismissal 
of morganatic marriage can be understood as socially conservative and intended to 
reinforce social boundaries. Alternatively, it can be understood as expressing concern 
for the role of women within marriage, since morganatic marriages standardly 
featured the husband in the more powerful position (see 27: 641.3-6).  
In any case, Kant’s dismissal of morganatic marriage is evidence that he believed 
equality to be a condition of marriage.21 It also shows that we should understand the 
equal possession of each other as persons as the requirement that couples are able to 
acquire each other’s rights and maybe even certain aspects of their social status 
insofar as they impact an agent’s legal standing.22 The problem with morganatic 
marriage is that one of the parties is unable to acquire the other’s rights in part or in 
full. My main argument in this article can be put thusly: given Kant’s conception of 
the sexes, different-sex marriage resembles morganatic marriage and should hence be 
as problematic for Kant. I do put a lot of emphasis on morganatic marriage for my 
argument, but I think that what Kant says about it is in line with and follows from his 
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notion of equal possession of each other as persons. We should therefore not consider 
his remarks ad hoc. 
It should be noted that morganatic marriage is not merely marriage between persons 
of different rank, but marriage that retains that difference in rank. In rejecting 
morganatic marriage, Kant was not necessarily arguing that no persons of different 
rank should marry at all. It might still be possible for two people of different social 
and legal standing to marry each other if the more privileged partner renounces his 
privileges. However, there might be privileges that, unlike certain royal titles and 
claims to inheritance, cannot be renounced voluntarily, such as the right of full 
citizens to vote or to participate in public affairs (see sec. 4). Even if someone were 
not to exercise their rights, he would still have them, he could choose to exercise them 
and they would constitute something their partner, if she lacks these rights, cannot 
possess.  
Directly following his discussion of morganatic marriage, Kant in the same paragraph 
makes clear that the abstract legal equality that marriage requires need not preclude 
embodied and lived inequalities within marriage. The husband ‘is to be [the wife’s] 
master (he is the party to direct, she to obey)’ (6: 279.17-9), and Kant acknowledges a 
supposed ‘natural superiority of the husband to the wife in his capacity to promote the 
common interest of the household’ (6: 279.22-3). Within marriage one person has to 
be subjugated to the other (7: 303.15-7), an arrangement that is supposedly 
advantageous to both parties (7: 309.29-310.9, 27: :50.12-34). It is significant that 
these passages speak of inequality within marriage and with respect to the capacity to 
make decisions, not as a prerequisite for marriage. Kant here does not talk about legal 
inequality or inequality preceding marriage. As we saw, he excludes certain couples 
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from marriage on account of forms of insurmountable legal inequality prior to a 
potential marriage. However, once the marriage contract is established there can be 
(and maybe must be) inequality between the spouses on account of different cognitive 
abilities, interests, societal norms, etc.23  
In addition, Kant of course does not require that even prior to marriage spouses share 
literally everything. There can be inequality between them in terms of intelligence, 
physical attributes, level of education, and prerogatives acquired as a result of 
education. A lawyer’s spouse may not practice law just because he is married to a 
lawyer. He can practice law if he successfully passes the bar exam. Prerogatives 
acquired via special education and training must be excluded from what defines 
equality between persons for the purpose of marriage. 
As we have seen, inequality of a certain kind makes couples ineligible to marry on 
Kant’s conception of a rightful marriage. The case of morganatic marriage also shows 
that equality of possession cannot just mean that spouses have rights to each other that 
exclude everyone else, specifically to the exclusive use of their partner’s sexual 
organs.24 Morganatic marriages (as well as incestuous relationships between parents 
and children) can be monogamous and exclude third parties, yet Kant believes that 
they do not satisfy the requirements for a rightful marriage. Marriage must do more 
than just assure the spouses of the exclusivity of intercourse. It must be based on a 
certain form of equality, namely, equality as persons or legal equality.  
As I argued in sec. 1, the requirement that there be equality between spouses is an 
essential element of Kant’s account. Marriage is supposed to function as a safeguard, 
and it can only do this effectively if I give myself entirely to my partner, my partner 
does the same, and each of us thus receives ourselves back entirely. If I have a right 
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that my partner cannot share, the process cannot be fully reciprocal, and my partner is 
not protected in the same way I am. 
4. Kant on the Differences between Men and Women 
According to Barbara Herman (1993: 54), Kant might be the modern moral 
philosopher feminists find most objectionable.25 This is unsurprising as Kant claims 
that men and women are not even ‘of the same kind’ (‘Observations on The Beautiful 
and the Sublime’, 2: 228.34) and he calls women a ‘domestic animal’ (Hausthier, 7: 
304.12). It is, though, difficult to determine how much philosophical weight to place 
on Kant’s scattered sexist remarks. They mainly provide evidence that he was unable 
to distance himself from the prejudices of his time. He certainly bought into a highly 
gendered conception of human beings. Some of his feminist critics even allege that 
Kant believes that women lack something fundamental for being a full human being, 
such as rationality or moral agency.26 Different-sex intercourse should then rather be 
described from a Kantian perspective as a form of bestiality, and thus could not 
possibly take place within the union of marriage.  
However, it is not clear that Kant regards women as lacking rationality or moral 
agency, and we must now look at his comments about the differences between men 
and women in detail to understand how fundamental and deeply rooted they are. 
There are two areas of potential inequality that are relevant for us. The most important 
is that of (i) legal inequality, on which I will draw for my argument in the next 
section. Here I will also briefly discuss (ii) moral inequality, since some interpreters 
believe that this is the most fundamental form of gender inequality in Kant.  
(i) Since Kant discusses marriage primarily as a legal institution, legal inequality is 
the kind of inequality that is most immediately relevant to the marriage contract. 
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Women, Kant believes, lack ‘civil personality’ (6: 314.32) or ‘civil independence’ (6: 
315.5). This makes them merely passive citizens (6: 314.17-25). Active citizenship 
means that one can participate in the organization of government affairs, introduce 
laws and vote on them (6: 315.6-22). Women share the status of being merely passive 
citizens with many men: apprentices, domestic servants, minors, private tutors, and in 
general ‘anyone whose preservation in existence (his being fed and protected) 
depends not on his management of his own business but on arrangements made by 
another (except the state)’ (6: 314.29-31). Kant’s distinction between active and 
passive citizenship based on whether one is financially dependent on another person 
is certainly peculiar. What is important for us is that all the examples Kant gives of 
merely passive citizens are of particular occupations – except in the case of women, 
where the occupation seems not to matter.27  
In the Anthropology, Kant calls the state of merely passive citizenship immaturity 
(Unmündigkeit): the ‘(natural or legal) incapacity of an otherwise sound human being 
to use his own understanding in civil affairs’ (7: 208.34-5). This state can be based on 
age or legal arrangements. The latter is called ‘legal or civil immaturity’ (209.2). 
Women of all ages are in a state of legal immaturity.28 Husbands are their wives’ 
‘natural curator’ (209.5), since women cannot ‘defend their rights and pursue civil 
affairs for themselves, but only by means of representation’ (209.11-13). Here women 
are characterized with regard to legal affairs as inferior to men before marriage as 
well as within marriage. However, immediately after denying women full citizenship 
in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant concedes that: ‘[t]his dependence upon the will of 
others and this inequality is, however, in no way opposed to their freedom and 
equality as human beings’ (6: 315.6-8). It is unclear whether Kant believes that all 
passive citizens are equal to active citizens as human beings, or whether some humans 
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can, so to speak, be more human than others. The latter is strongly suggested when 
Kant speaks of the ‘natural superiority of the husband to the wife in his capacity to 
promote the common interest of the household’ (6: 279.22-3). It is important here that 
this superiority is said to be natural, i.e. not merely a result of non-ideal legal 
arrangements.  
There are two very different ways to understand Kant’s claims about legal inequality 
between men and women. One is that they are intended as descriptions of the social 
implications of the natural inferiority of women. The other is that Kant here describes 
inequalities that only exist in non-ideal social settings, and that these inequalities can 
be overcome through social progress. Kant wavers between the idea that gender 
inequality is due to women’s natural and necessary inferiority, and the idea that 
women’s state of immaturity is socially constructed and can and should be exited. In 
what follows, Kant’s claims about gender inequality lending themselves to the latter 
interpretation will be of central significance for my argument, as they do not hinge on 
the sexist assumption that women are naturally inferior. 
(ii) The notion that for Kant women do not even count as moral agents and as fully 
rational is fuelled mainly by his early Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful 
and Sublime from 1764 and his Remarks on the Observations on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and Sublime from around the same time. In the former, Kant claims that 
women will avoid evil not because it is wrong, but because it is ugly: ‘Nothing of 
ought, nothing of must, nothing of obligation’ (2: 231.32). Women ‘do something 
only because they love to’ (2: 232.1) not because of moral principles. In the latter, 
Kant declares that men should not count on a woman’s conception of her duty to 
ensure her fidelity, but rather keep her loyal through love and honour (20: 77.1-5). 
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According to these claims, women cannot but act on their inclinations or feelings and 
they can never act for the sake of morality. If women were truly incapable of acting 
from duty, they would indeed not be moral agents in Kant’s sense, and not possess the 
same rational capacities as men. 
However, whilst Kant greatly deprecates women in his Observations and Reflections, 
we must keep in mind that these works are pre-critical. Even without entering the 
fraught debate about when exactly Kant introduced a conception of action from 
respect for the moral law into his ethics29, we can say that at the time of the 
Observations and the Reflections Kant did not yet envisage a moral agent who can act 
from reason alone. Kant might simply have thought that both men and women act 
from different emotions: Men from a sense of honour, women from emotions such as 
sympathy, jealousy and love. Whilst this is still objectionable, it does not warrant the 
claim that women are not moral agents for Kant.30 The critical Kant, by contrast, 
admits that women like to debate the potential moral worth of actions and considers 
this an expression of their genuine concern for morality (Critique of Practical Reason, 
5: 153.13-154.16). This is of course still highly belittling and does not show that Kant 
thinks that women can do more than talk about morality. Ultimately, what Kant thinks 
about the agency of women after he introduced autonomy and respect for the moral 
law into his philosophy might be unanswerable. In his major critical writings on 
moral philosophy, he focuses on the source and supreme principle of morality 
(Groundwork and second Critique) as well as on the application of this principle to 
more or less concrete cases (Metaphysics of Morals). Many important questions, such 
as who counts as a moral agent, are left open. 
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It is not clear that Kant does really think that women lack reason, autonomy or agency 
and thus, in what follows, I will focus on legal inequality, since it is very clear that 
Kant assumes that there are significant legal inequalities between men and women. 
5. Kant on Different-Sex Marriage 
According to Kant, the marriage contract requires equality between partners (sec. 1), 
and inequality can disqualify certain unions from rightful marriage (sec. 3). Thus 
given the stark de facto legal inequalities between men and women (sec. 4), Kant 
cannot, according to his own account, approve of different-sex marriage.31 
In fact, legal inequality is such a big obstacle to different-sex marriage on Kant’s 
account that it is not even clear that women have the legal standing to enter into a 
marriage contract at all.32 After all, one of the reasons why marriage is good for 
women, Kant believes, is that women acquire a curator who can take care of their 
legal affairs for them (see 7: 209.5 and sec. 4 above). Presumably, women do have 
such a curator prior to marriage as well, normally their fathers. However, Kant never 
claims that a marriage contract is between a man and another man who is the legal 
curator of the bride. Moreover, there could hardly be anything less indicative of one’s 
respect for one’s future wife’s humanity than to enter into a contract with a 
completely different person about the use of her sexual organs. We should therefore 
assume that, according to Kant, women can enter contracts with men, but that their 
legal status makes them the decisively weaker party. 
Clearly, according to what Kant himself says about men and women, they are not 
equals in any standard sense of the term. Importantly, they are also not equals 
according to what Kant correctly says about the status of women at the time, namely, 
that women are de facto deprived of full participation in society. Thus we cannot 
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simply solve the tension between Kant’s conception of marriage as between equals 
and gender inequalities by concluding that he should just drop his sexist prejudices 
and stereotypes. Clearly, he should. However, as a matter of fact, women at the time 
lacked important rights and were in a very real sense not equal to men. This matter of 
fact inequality to which Kant is sensitive is central for my argument. It shows that it is 
not the case that my argument proceeds via a particularly charitable reading of the 
implications of his theory for the morality of same-sex intercourse and a much less 
charitable take on his remarks on women. Some of Kant’s remarks pertaining to 
women’s lack of rights and of opportunities to participate in public life reflect 
inequalities that exist independently of Kant’s own sexist attitudes. We can therefore 
bracket his merely sexist remarks for the purpose of my argument, just as I suggest 
that we should not rely on Kant’s homophobic statements, given that they cannot be 
sustained in the context of his own theory. I suggest that, across the board, we 
abandon claims that do not fit with Kant’s theory, work out what his theory entails, 
and then apply the theory to the social reality as Kant correctly captured it in 
observing that women do not have the same rights as (some) men. This, of course, 
raises the question of what the upshot of Kant’s conception of marriage would be for 
a society where men and women do enjoy equal rights. I will take up this issue below. 
We first have to look at legal inequality in more detail. 
Due to inequality before the law, women cannot acquire important aspects of full 
citizens’ personhood. The best example of this is the right to vote. If I, as a full 
citizen, have the right to vote and my partner does not, there is, so to speak, 
something that I own and that my partner cannot acquire. This is unlike other 
differences such as that I own a car and my partner does not. The car could simply 
become our joint property. In the case of rights that my partner cannot share, my 
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personhood extends to fields that my partner cannot share.33 No matter in what sense 
men and women might be equals for Kant, for instance as rational agents, in the sense 
relevant to his conception of marriage they were not equals in Kant’s time. 
Admittedly, it might be odd to think of the right to vote as something that can be 
owned, but as I explained earlier, property relations are Kant’s model for legally 
relevant interpersonal relations. In these terms, then, passive citizens can have equal 
access to active citizen’s bodies and property but not to their rights, and both can 
therefore not fully and reciprocally possess each other as persons. Whilst this is 
potentially a problem for all couples (different-sex and same-sex), it is easier for 
same-sex couples to satisfy the equality requirement, since in same-sex unions both 
partners are ‘of the same kind’ (‘Beautiful and Sublime,’ 2: 228.34), to speak with 
Kant, or more likely to be able to share the same rights. It seems that, according to 
Kant’s conception, all or at least the vast majority of eighteenth-century women were 
not eligible marriage material for male full citizens, and vice versa. 
However, this might still leave room for two kinds of different-sex marriage even on 
Kant’s account. Firstly, women who have attained active citizenship, if this is 
possible, might become spouses of active male citizens and, secondly, passive male 
citizens might be able to marry passive female citizens. The first possibility hinges on 
whether women can attain a citizenship status equal to that of male full citizens. Many 
of the circumstances that, according to Kant, bar women from full civil participation 
are a product of non-ideal, unenlightened social circumstances. Kant even once claims 
that ‘anyone can work their way up from their passive [civil] condition to an active 
one’ (6: 315.19-22).34 It would then be a direction of progressive transformation of 
society to liberate women and others who are being denied full participation. The 
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possibility of different-sex marriage on Kant’s framework would then be something to 
strive towards and the result of an accomplished enlightenment. We should bear in 
mind, however, that active citizenship might only be one hurdle among others. Even 
active male and female citizens might be unequal in the sense that, unless gender 
inequality of all kinds is radically eliminated, active citizenship might be much harder 
to attain, maintain and exercise for women than for men. This raises the question of 
how to understand the impact of forms of inequality other than legal inequalities in 
the sense that certain people are explicitly denied rights.  
The second possibility also requires that we think more about the impact of other than 
strictly legal inequality. Passive male citizens still have the upper hand over passive 
female citizens in the sense that it is easier for them to ascend to active citizenship. In 
addition, there might be important gender differences even within the respective 
classes of citizenship: passive male citizens will be much more likely to have the 
economic upper hand, they will be more respected by society, their opinions will 
count for more, etc. Much of this of course also holds for a different-sex union 
between active citizens.  
It seems then that, according to Kant’s conception, all or at least the vast majority of 
eighteenth-century women were not eligible marriage material for men, or at least for 
male full citizens, and vice versa. Has this changed since?  Whilst the legal status of 
women today is very different from the late eighteenth century, there still obviously 
exist wide-spread economic and other gender-inequalities. These, whilst not a form of 
legal inequality in the strict sense, stifle women’s full participation in civil affairs and 
the exercise of their maturity.   
 
 24 
I cannot here settle the question whether Kant’s conception of marriage would still 
rule out different-sex marriages today, as this would require a more in-depth 
discussion than can be afforded me. In any case, the decisive issue is whether equality 
as persons only requires the same legal rights, or also the same protection by the legal 
system and even the same opportunities to exercise legal rights. At Kant’s time even 
the first of these conditions did not obtain, whereas nowadays in many societies it 
does, but even these societies still often fall short of making legal systems work 
equally well for all and of affording the same opportunities to exercise rights, as these 
opportunities are frequently restricted by economic and social factors.  
A further question for Kant himself would have been this. Even if different-sex 
marriage was inconsistent with right at Kant’s time, what would have been the 
alternative? Staying in a sexual state of nature would endanger the survival of the 
species or at least entail that the species could only be preserved by immoral means, 
outside of marriage. Alternatively, maybe the institution of marriage itself could have 
become a mechanism for establishing gender equality? This, however, would not 
work as long as we hold on to the idea that marriage already requires a form of 
equality. This is an idea we should hold on to, I believe. The equality requirement is 
the intuitive and plausible core of Kant’s conception of marriage. Different-sex 
marriage, something that many still see as of significant social importance, cannot be 
rightful as long as women are not full and equal members of society and it cannot be a 
relation between a master or curator and an immature or disadvantaged domestic 
servant.  In addition, even if marriage established equality between the spouses, for 
instance by mandating that women are granted all the rights of their spouses, in the 
absence of other and more universal tools to establish equality before marriage, this 
would still leave unmarried women deprived of certain rights.  
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Here it seems to me that we would simply have to envision the possibility that Kant 
might have overcome the assumption that a couple is either married and enjoys 
mutually enforceable rights and protections, or they are not and no (or hardly any) 
protections obtain. In particular, on such an assumption, it would indeed be a problem 
if heterosexual intercourse, the main way to procreate, could not take place within the 
context of a rightful marriage.  
The problematic assumption here is that it is only marriage as a contractual institution 
that can render sex morally permissible. Marriage is supposed to create legally 
enforceable protections of partners against domination. But we now know that 
marriage is not uniquely suited to achieve this. Civil partnerships also constitute an 
institutional framework for partnerships, and even ‘mere’ romantic couples have 
legally enforceable rights against each other, such as against rape, physical abuse, and 
in some countries even against controlling behaviour.35 With respect to our own day 
in any case, the question might not be so much whether different-sex couples are now 
equal enough to marry, but rather whether there now exist ample protections for 
people to engage in sexual intercourse without endangering their humanity and 
opening themselves up to domination. Shifting our attention to this question would 
also address the worry that it still seems illiberal if intercourse is morally permissible 
only in the context of a marriage, even one founded on equality between the partners.  
Conclusion 
What can we learn from a philosopher who characterizes marriage as ‘the union of 
two persons of different sexes for lifelong possession of each other’s sexual 
attributes’ (6: 277.25-6), and who calls women ‘domestic animals’ (7: 304.12)? Kant 
has the sensible idea that unequal relationships do not deserve the special status 
marriage enjoys. However, whether a relationship is one between equals is not 
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entirely up to the spouses but also determined by external factors. This puts different-
sex relationships in a problematic position relative to same-sex relationships, as it is 
more difficult for the former to realize equality. Same-sex relationships, by contrast, 
lack gender-specific inequalities (though of course they are still susceptible to other 
forms of inequality), and hence they might do better in realizing a good that is 
important for relationships.  
I hope to have clarified in this paper what Kant is committed to concerning marriage. 
It goes without saying that this does not constitute an argument for same-sex marriage 
or against different-sex marriage that can be applied straightforwardly to 
contemporary debates. If we want to see whether the argument I have reconstructed 
from Kant would have implications for current debates, we would have to talk about 
much more complex and insidious forms of inequality than the ones Kant focuses 
on.36  
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33 This problem is explicitly mentioned by Kant in an unpublished reflection: ‘If the 
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